When a
single human being holds the power to wipe away guilt, reduce punishment, or
undo the finality of justice, something both magnificent and unsettling occurs.
This moment, when law bows before mercy exposes the tension between the laws’s cold logic and humanity’s deep
need for compassion. It is this tension that lies at the heart of the debate
over the Prerogative of Mercy.
Across the
world, most constitutional systems grant the head of state or government this
extraordinary authority, the power to pardon, commute, or remit sentences.
Though often exercised on the advice of a council or board, in practice the
discretion is vast and deeply personal. This then raises a profound question: Should
any one person truly have this power?
Essentially,
the prerogative of mercy exposes a philosophical fault line. On one side stands
the rule of law, demanding that justice be impartial, predictable, and rooted
in established process. On the other side stands human compassion, which
recognises that no legal system is perfect, that every system occasionally
errs, grows too rigid, or fails to reflect the complexity of human lives. Mercy
exists as a safety valve, a corrective for error, and a gesture of
reconciliation. But when mercy appears arbitrary or politically motivated, it
corrodes public confidence in justice itself.
The
dilemma is therefore not merely legal; it is moral and political. Should
societies continue with systems where mercy depends on the conscience or whims
of a single leader, or should they evolve toward structures that
institutionalise compassion while upholding transparency and accountability?
Those who
defend the existing model point to its flexibility. In moments of urgency, when
an innocent person suffers unjustly, or when humanitarian grounds demand swift
relief, the ability to act decisively can save lives. Mercy, in this sense,
adds a necessary human touch to an otherwise mechanical justice system,
acknowledging repentance, ill health, or extraordinary circumstances. In deeply
divided societies, well-timed acts of clemency can even aid national healing
and reconciliation.
Yet there
is a darker side. Concentrating such power in one person invites abuse. It
risks favoritism, political manipulation, and the perception that justice is
negotiable. When mercy is granted without transparency, it begins to look less
like compassion and more like patronage. Moreover, victims and communities
often have no voice in decisions that affect their sense of justice and
closure. In a democracy, a single individual erasing judicial outcomes without
explanation feels not merciful but monarchical.
The answer
lies not in abolishing mercy but in reforming it. Mercy should not be personal;
it should be institutional. What is needed is a transparent and participatory
system of collective clemency guided by clear principles. Every nation
can benefit from establishing an Independent Clemency Commission composed of
retired judges, civil society representatives, victims’ advocates, and
rehabilitation experts. This body would review applications, consult victims,
and publish reasoned recommendations. The head of state may retain final
approval but should be required to record and publish the reasons for any
departure from the Commission’s advice.
Clear
criteria should guide such processes: time served, evidence of rehabilitation,
humanitarian grounds, or wrongful conviction. Victims or their families should
have the right to contribute their perspectives, ensuring that mercy does not
silence justice. For sensitive cases, particularly those involving public trust
or official misconduct, parliamentary or judicial oversight could provide an
added layer of accountability. Transparency is not an enemy of mercy; it is its
only safeguard.
Equally
vital is the distinction between pardon and exoneration. A pardon forgives
guilt; exoneration declares that guilt was undeserved from the start. In
societies seeking reconciliation, symbolic acts of acknowledgment and
restorative justice may serve truth more deeply than belated gestures of
forgiveness.
Would
these reforms erase the aura of absolute authority that surrounds clemency? Not entirely. The power to forgive will always
carry moral weight. But by embedding it within a transparent, principled
institution, mercy ceases to be the privilege of rulers and becomes the right
of a just society to temper law with humanity, without sacrificing fairness.
So, should
any one person have the power of mercy? Perhaps not, at least not as a personal or unchecked prerogative. Nevertheless, every just society must retain the capacity to soften justice
with grace. The moral task before us is to make mercy accountable; to transform
it from a gesture of favour into a function of justice. When mercy ceases to be
arbitrary and becomes principled, the state honours both compassion and the
rule of law.